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Following the early 1980s apparent consensus of negative significant but modest minimum wage 
employment effect (Brown et al., 1982), there has been a controversial debate in the literature over the 
direction of this effect (Brown, 1999).  Explanations to non-negative effects range from theoretical to 
empirical identification and data issues (Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999).  An explanation, 
however, that has not been sufficiently explored is that a non-negative effect might be an upward 
biased estimate of a truly negative effect.  Such a bias might result from the simultaneous
determination of the minimum wage and employment (Williams and Mills, 1998 and 2001). 
This paper estimates the employment effect of the minimum wage using a number of political 
variables – not previously used in the literature – as excluded exogenous instruments to control for the 
endogeneity of the minimum wage variable.
Furthermore, a number of other conceptual and identification questions are also discussed to 
ensure full identification of the minimum wage effect.  For example:  (1) A national minimum wage
cannot explain variation in employment across regions (Brown et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1995). 
Identification of the effect of the minimum wage separately from the effect of other variables on 
employment requires regional variation if no restriction on time modeling is imposed.  This motivates
the use of “fraction at” as a minimum wage variable, which is here argued to be superior to the
commonly used “Kaitz index”, real minimum wage and “fraction affected”. (2) Identification of the 
effect of the minimum wage separately from the effect of unobserved regional macro fixed effects on 
employment requires modeling fixed effects, which are implemented here.  (3) An employment
decomposition that separately estimates the effect of the minimum wage on hours worked and on the 
number of jobs is utilized (Lemos, 2004a).  If the first effect is positive and the second effect is
negative, this could be an explanation of non-negative (total) employment effects.
The data used is an under-explored Brazilian monthly household survey from 1982 to 2000.  The
limited available literature for Brazil, in line with the international empirical literature, suggests that an 
increase in the minimum wage does not always have a significant effect on employment and it is not 
always negative (Carneiro, 2002; Corseuil and Servo, 2002; Neumark et al., 2003).
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the data.  Section 3 estimates descriptive
models.  Section 4 discusses identification: lags of the endogenous variable are used as instruments
under the assumption of errors serially uncorrelated (Section 4.1); and political variables are used as 
exogenous excluded instruments when this assumption is relaxed (Section 4.2).  Robust results indicate 
that an increase in the minimum wage has very small adverse effects on employment.
2. DATA
The data used is PME (Monthly Employment Survey), a rotating panel data for six Brazilian
metropolitan regions between 1982 and 2000, similar to the US CPS (Current Population Survey),
available from IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica).
The nominal minimum wage in Brazil is national and coverage is full.
1  The nominal minimum
wage was under-indexed over time, as a result of indexation rules of successive stabilization plans.  For
example, in early 1986, it was bi-annually adjusted initially, but then adjusted whenever inflation was
higher than 20%.  In mid 1987, it was initially frozen for three months before it was indexed monthly
by past inflation.  In early 1989, it was again frozen, and in mid 1989 it was again indexed monthly.  In 
1 Accommodation and food costs can be deducted from the wage.  That might account for some below minimum wage
workers, although the majority of those are informal sector workers.
1late 1991, it was again monthly indexed.  In 1993, adjustments were bi-monthly and then monthly.  In
early 1994, adjustments were daily, and since mid 1995 they have been yearly.
The correlation of the difference of log nominal hourly minimum wage ( ) with the difference
of log total average hours worked (
MW
T ) is -0.04; with the difference of log average hours worked by 
those working (H ) is -0.05; and with the difference of log of employment rate (E ) is 0.06. This
suggests that when the minimum wage is increased, the total number of hours worked decreases, 
mainly through a decrease in hours worked, rather than through a decrease in the number of jobs. 
3. DESCRIPTIVE MODELS
Following Lemos (2004a), a simple empirical model of employment as a function of the minimum
wage, grounded on the standard neoclassical theory, is: 
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where  is taken in turn to mean rt employment T , H  and E  in region r  and month t, 6 ,..., 1   r , and 
;  is past inflation;  and  are region and time fixed effects modeled by 
region and time dummies;  is the error term; and   are variables that control for region 
specific demographics correlated with the minimum wage, i.e. the proportion of workers in the 
population who are: young, younger than 10 years old, women, illiterates, retired, students, in urban
areas, in the public sector, in the building construction industry sector, in the metallurgic industry 
sector, basic education degree holders, high school degree holders, and the proportion of workers with 
a second job.
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2  Dynamics account for lagged responses in employment following a minimum wage 
increase (Hamermesh, 1995).
3  The models were White-corrected and sample size weighted to account 
for the relative importance of each region and for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation.  By
modeling regional and time fixed effects and including controls and dynamics, the errors are no longer 
expected to be serially correlated over time.
4
Equation (1) is separately estimated using each of the three employment variables (T , H  and E )
in turn as dependent variables.  The coefficient of the minimum wage in the T  equation equals the sum
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possible to decompose the total effect of a minimum wage increase on employment into hours effect 
and jobs effect (Lemos, 2004a).
Because the nominal minimum wage is the same across regions in Brazil, E  is not identified.
Even using the “relative minimum wage” variables typically used in the literature, namely the real
minimum wage and the “Kaitz index” (Kaitz, 1970) – defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to 
2 Particularly debatable is the inclusion of a variable measuring enrolment rates in school (Card and Krueger, 1995;
Neumark and Wascher, 1992 and 1996), which was not included here because of the unresolved debate (Williams, 1993;
Baker et al., 1999).  The debate is about whether a reduced form or a demand equation is estimated (Card and Krueger,
1995; Brown, 1999), depending on whether enrolment rates are simultaneously determined with employment or not.
3 Employment is reported to be AR(2) using annual data (Layard et al., 1991), which is equivalent to 24 lags on monthly
data.  The results were robust to including 12 lags only, but that was thought to prematurely censor the adjustment process
because further lags were still significant.
4 The results were robust to SUR estimation. GMM a la Arellano and Bond (1991) is not an option because T>N.
5 Because of dynamics in the form of lagged dependent variables, the set of regressors is not the same in all three equations
and the OLS additivity property does not hold exactly.
2average wage adjusted for coverage of the legislation – does not ensure identification, because the 
variation in the ratio is driven by the variation in the denominator (Welch and Cunningham, 1978; 
Freeman, 1982).  Because of that, “degree of impact” measures are becoming common in the literature
(Brown, 1999), for example, “fraction affected” – defined as the proportion of workers earning a wage
between the old and the new minimum wage (Card, 1992) – and  “fraction at” the minimum wage in 
the wage distribution (Section 2.2) – defined as the proportion of workers earning one minimum wage 
(Dolado et al., 1996) (plus or minus 0.02% to account for rounding approximations).
While “fraction affected” is constant at zero when the minimum wage is constant, and thus it does 
not capture the erosion of the minimum wage in relation to other wages; “fraction at” is not only a 
measure of this erosion, but it is also a measure of those workers whose wages went up and thus a 
measure of employment extra costs.  Its correlation with the log nominal hourly minimum wage in the 
sample period is 0.40.  Therefore, “fraction at” is the minimum wage variable used to estimate
Equation (1).
Even though “fraction at” has variation across regions and over time, modeling time effects with 
interactions of month and year dummies would eliminate all the variation in the model.  That is
because the variation in the minimum wage (and associated variation in “fraction at”) is not 
independent of the variation in the time dummies since the minimum wage is systematically increased
on a particular month (mostly May).  Thus, time effects are modeled by year and month dummies but 
not their interaction, to control for fixed effects across years and months (Burkhauser et al, 2000).  In 
addition, stabilization plan dummies are included to capture common macro shocks under each of the 
five stabilization plans in the sample period, and a dummy in October of 1988 is added to account for
the introduction of the New Constitution.  The regional dummies model region specific trends because 
regions are expected to differ not only in the position but also in the pace of their business cycles.
Table 1 shows positive estimates.  A 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage (increases
“fraction at” by 0.3 percentage points and)
6 is associated to an increase in total employment of 0.13%,
decomposed into an increase in the number of hours worked of 0.13% and no change in the number of 
jobs.  The total and hours estimates are significant and the jobs estimate is non-significant.  However,
this is a correlation, once the model is purely descriptive.  The next step is an attempt to estimate
behavioural effects.
4. IDENTIFICATION
The identification strategy here has three steps. (1) By using “fraction at” as a measure of the
different impact of a constant minimum wage across regions, the effect of the minimum wage is not 
confounded with the effect of other macro variables on employment.  (2) By accounting for regional 
fixed effects, the effect of the minimum wage (measured by “fraction at”) is not confounded with the
effect of unobserved macro fixed effects on employment.  The last step is to control for simultaneity
bias.  (3) By correcting for simultaneity bias, the effect of the minimum wage (measured by “fraction 
at”) is not confounded with the effect of unobserved macro variables on employment.
6 The 0.3 calibration factor is the coefficient of the nominal minimum wage on a regression of the difference of “fraction at”
on the difference of the log of the nominal minimum wage and the other regressors in Equation (1).  Because the nominal
minimum wage does not vary across regions, this model was also estimated using the nominal minimum wage normalized
by the average (median and the 25
th percentile), producing remarkably robust results. The intuition is given by a simple
deterministic model, where , x b a y 1 1    z b a y 2 2    , x b a z 3 3     and  3 2 1 b b b   ,  0 , , 3 2 1 z b b b  (Lemos, 2004a).
3Even if the nominal minimum wage is assumed to be predetermined,
7 “fraction at” and 
employment are simultaneously determined.  Once the minimum wage is increased, the relative wage 
bargains determine the workers’ position in the wages distribution; this also determines who earns one 
minimum wage, i.e. who is at the “fraction at”.  An exogenous or predetermined variable – that affects
employment only via “fraction at” – is necessary to ensure identification.  Under the assumption of 
serially uncorrelated errors, two such an instrumental variables are suggested.
Firstly, the twelve first lags of “fraction at” – naturally correlated with “fraction at” but
uncorrelated with the error term – fulfil the properties of a valid instrument. Panel 1 of Table 2 shows 
estimates of a fairly similar sign, magnitude and significance to the uninstrumented estimates in Table 
1 (Section 3).  A 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage is associated to an increase in total
employment of 0.16%, decomposed into an increase in the number of hours worked of 0.15% and no 
change in the number of jobs.
Secondly, the Necessary Minimum Wage (SMN) – defined in the Constitution as the subsistence 
income for an adult worker and their family – and its twelve first lags are used as instruments.  The 
SMN measures the hypothetical past inflation that would have been experienced by minimum wage 
workers across regions if they consumed the SMN bundle.  It is a constructed, not an observed 
variable.  That is because the SMN bundle has never been affordable at the prevalent minimum wage.
The correlation between the two in differences is 0.53.  SMN is thought to be well correlated with the
systematic part of the minimum wage but not correlated with the endogenous part of it.  That is because 
the SMW, being a constructed variable, does not really play a role in wages and employment
determination.  Therefore it is not simultaneously determined with employment.  Panel 2 of Table 2 
shows negative estimates.  A 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage is associated to a decrease in 
total employment of 0.11%, decomposed into a decrease in the number of hours worked of 0.05% and 
a decrease in the number of jobs of 0.04%.  The estimates are now non-significant. 
4.1 SERIAL CORRELATION
In Section 4, the errors were assumed uncorrelated over time.  Ultimately, an orthogonality 
condition must be made to produce an estimable equation and it is not too unrealistic to assume that 
serial correlation will vanish after differencing, adding dynamics, controls, regional and time dummies. 
The overidentifying restrictions (Sargan) test can be used to verify this assumption (Andrews, 1999; 
Szroeter, 2000).
Panels 1 and 2 of Table 3 show the associated Sargan test, Hausman test and F test (in the first step 
of the 2SLS) for the models in Panels 1 and 2 of Table 2.  The Hausman test does not show much 
evidence of endogeneity, as expected from the discussion in Section 4; the F test shows the instruments
performed well; but the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in Panel 2 – this 
invalidates the use of SMN and its lags as instruments for “fraction at” in Equation (1), and casts 
doubts on the use of lags of “fraction at”. 
Only an excluded instrument with truly exogenous variation, uncorrelated with the error term and 
all its past lags, will ensure consistency.  Political variables are suggested as an attempt to define such 
an instrument.
7 The nominal minimum wage might be endogenous if its increases are related to regional macroeconomic performance
(Card and Krueger, 1995; William and Mills, 1998 and 2001).  Further endogeneity can be caused by the denominator of
the real minimum wage (Kaitz index), i.e. price (average wage) deflators (Dolado et al, 1996; Zavodny, 2000).  The most
obvious instruments for “fraction at”, other than its own lags, are lagged real minimum wage and lagged Kaitz index.
However, they do not ensure identification, as discussed in Section 3; and they suffer from the same drawback as “fraction
at” when serial correlation is relaxed (Section 4.1).
44.2 EXCLUDED EXOGENEOUS INSTRUMENTS 
Three different sources of political variables were used to define exogenous excluded instruments.
Table 4 gives the institutional details underlying the validity of the instruments and their raw 
correlations.
4.2.1 Politicians Data
It is well established in the literature on the politics of the minimum wage that politicians might
favour or oppose minimum wage increases depending on the overall macroeconomic performance in 
each region.  Card and Krueger (1995, p. 134) argue, “Politicians from states in which an increase in 
the minimum wage is expected to have a strong effect on wages or employment opportunities might
oppose the increase, whereas those from states in which the expected effect is smaller might support 
it.”  The final increase is the result of compromise between competing interest groups (regions)
(Becker, 1983).  In other words, the final increase is a regional weighted average; the impact of the 
increase in each region determines the political support (the relative weight) of that region to the 
increase.
In Brazil, the Intersyndical Department of Parliamentary Consultancy (1) ranks the 100 most
influential congressmen according to political science criteria (debating, negotiating, voting,
articulating, forming opinion, leading, etc.) rating their powers of persuasion (DIAP, 1994 to 2002); 
and (2) attributes marks to politicians voting in favour of workers in labour related bills (DIAP, 1986, 
1990, 1994a and 2002).  These are measures of regional weight and were here used as instruments for 
the sampled regions.  The more influential congressmen from a particular region, the more weight on 
the interests of that region; and the more pro-increase (contra-increase) these influential congressmen,
the higher (lower) the minimum wage.
8  Sobel (1999) argues that interest group pressure significantly 
influenced congressional voting on the passage of the minimum wage bills in the US.  Panel I of Table 
4 shows mostly strong correlations. 
These measures are not thought to be simultaneously determined with employment.  First, the
influential status is based on personal characteristics.  Second, the pro-increase (pro-worker) status is 
acquired by consistently voting in favour of workers in workers related bills.  Most of these bills are 
not directly related to employment, as for example: land reform, union leader tenure, president mandate
length, etc.
9  The pro-worker status was re-defined using solely those bills not simultaneously
determined with employment but the results were robust to either definition.  Dummies were also
defined for whether these politicians are left or right wing,
10 whether or not they hold a degree, and the 
number of mandates they hold, which were then interacted.
4.2.2 Voting  Data
Some might argue that voting data would measure the regional weight more directly associated 
with minimum wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1995) used voting data to construct a measure of 
8 It is more intuitive to discuss the sign of the correlation in relation to the minimum wage even though the above are
instruments for “fraction at”.  Both correlations should bear the same sign, because “fraction at” and minimum wage are
positively correlated (Section 3).  Where the correlations differ substantially, they are pointed out in the text.
9 For a full list, see DIAP (1986, 1990, 1994a and 2002).  These publications are not part of a series; they have slightly
different methodologies that required some adjustment.  But the main idea is the same – grading politicians on how worker
sympathetic they are. 
10 Left wing designation according to Figueiredo and Limongi (1995).
5political support.  Similar data, accounting for votes in favour and against a minimum wage bill by 
politicians of the sampled regions, was collected for Brazil.
11  Usually, pressure against the bill results
in inflation erosion of the real minimum wage (Sobel, 1999).  In Brazil, there are two distinct reasons 
to oppose the increase.  In line with the above, pressure against the increase means that the increase 
cannot be afforded; this argument is usually related to the inflation impact or public deficit impact of 
the increase.  In contrast, pressure against the increase means that the increase is not large enough to 
even maintain the minimum wage purchase power; this argument is usually related to protecting the
worker’s standard of living.  Examples of both arguments can be found in the newspapers: 
“…to buy the same basket as in 1940, when it was introduced, the minimum wage would have to be 
R$517.55 [as opposed to the current R$130]” (Estadao, 10
th May, 1998).
“The popular movement against the minimum wage of R$151 toughens up in Brasilia at Easter, when a 
circus tent will be installed in front of the Congress to shelter 1,000 retired workers who will camp there
until voting on the bill on the 26
th. The vigil will include a mass for the “conversion” of deputies and
senators in favour of a more generous minimum wage…  ” (Estadao, 19
th April, 2000). 
“The Government makes the minimum wage increase conditional upon the inflation level, the benefits and 
pension bill, the Estates and Cities finances…  Most Congressmen know that a big increase would put at
risk the economic stability of the country.” (Estadao, 15
th January 1998).
“The minimum wage increase affected inflation… but the time is long gone when the increase would spread
through the whole Economy, like the petrol increase” (Estadao, 13
th May, 2000).
The underlying reason for being against the increase will depend on the political and economic
context, party affiliation and workers’ bargaining power, which naturally vary over time.  In Brazil, in 
most of the sample period, the centralized wage policy was intended to be deflationary via under-
indexation of the real minimum wage (Section 2).  In this context, opposing such a policy meant
protecting the worker’s living standard.  Thus, the more congressmen against the increase, the more
pressure for a larger increase, and the higher the minimum wage.  Panel II of Table 4 shows strong 
negative correlations.
12  Absence (not justifiable absence through sickness, official mission, etc.) is also 
important because it might be a strategy against the passage of the bill.  For example:
“The increasing tension between allies and adversaries of the Government because of the difficulties in 
finding a solution to the minimum wage increase might stop the voting… the leader of the Labour Party…
announced yesterday that his party will be absent”  (Estadao, 9th November, 2000).
Card and Krueger (1995, p. 135) used their political variable as a “proxy for otherwise
unobservable factors in a state that might be related to the impact of the law”, implicitly assuming a
direct effect on employment over and above the indirect effect via the minimum wage.  There is no 
reason to believe that at the time politicians are voting the bill, this is having a simultaneous effect on 
employment in Brazil.  Firstly, the minimum wage is more related to the wage-price spiral than to 
employment.  Firms anticipate the spiral, which is a rapid phenomenon under high inflation, and do not 
adjust employment to avoid incurring in adjustment costs (Lemos, 2004b).  Secondly, any arguments
that the voting data instruments might be endogenous should be considered in the light of the 
robustness of the results across instruments (Tables 2 and 3).  In the presence of severe endogeneity,
there is no reason why politicians data, voting data, and election data instruments would produce bias 
in the same direction and of similar magnitudes.
11 This data was collected from the National Congress Daily (Diario do Congresso Nacional, DCN).
12 A positive sign was expected for IV10 and IV11.  The number of congressmen both in favour and against the increase can
move in the same direction as the minimum wage, but the proportions are not expected to.  Thus, proportions were defined
(IV15 and IV16).  Although the sign remains negative, the correlations are robust across definitions and variables – they
cannot have happened by chance alone.  Most importantly, there is plausible economic reasoning for either a positive or a
negative correlation.  Provided the correlation is nonzero and stable over time, it suffices to establish a robust correlation.
6An interesting feature of voting data is that voting can be non-secret (nominal), secret, or party 
oriented, for which a “voting dummy” is defined.  During the dictatorship there was no voting, and 
when there was, it was symbolic – this is an exogenous instrument in itself.  Parties orient the vote 
prior to voting; non-secret votes (only on demand) are usually a strategy of those opposing the increase 
(favouring a larger increase) to expose their opponents.  For example:
“In a convoluted session stretching until early morning, the Government got the Congress to approve the 
R$151 minimum wage… after 3 months of fighting and thanks to a full day of intense lobbying.  The
session, due to start at 7pm, was postponed to 8pm, to prevent voting going live on television, exposing the 
‘situation’ Congressmen [those in favour of the R$151 Government proposal] …who did not succeed in 
making a deal for symbolic voting, which guarantees the anonymity of votes.  The opposition
Congressmen… insisted on nominal voting”. (Estadao, 11th May 2000). “By determination of the
president… the general secretary will list the names of the Congressmen who will be punished for voting
against the Government.” (Estadao, 12th May 2000).
The lower the minimum wage, the more pressure for a larger increase, and the more often non-
secret votes are demanded.  Panel II of Table 4 shows strong negative correlations.  Block (1980 and 
1989) and Card and Krueger (1995) discuss party influence on the passage of minimum wage bills in 
the US.  Weighting the number and proportion of votes by the voting dummy generates an additional 
instrument.  This places more weight on the more reliable non-secret votes data, which also represents
more proactive pro-increase and democratic times.  Panel II of Table 4 shows strong negative
correlations.
Another way to measure the political bargaining process is to consider the frequency of increases.
An increase occurred whenever the socio-economic-political tension became unbearable (81/217 
months).  The timing of the increases can be regarded as a measure of tension and used to define a
“voting cycle” variable.
13  The more often bills are presented, the higher the minimum wage (the lesser 
inflation erosion).  Panel II of Table 4 shows positive correlations.  The voting cycle is assumed to be 
predetermined, as tension at each moment is a function of past events.  Weighting the voting data by 
the voting cycle generates an additional political variable that measures regional political support over 
time.  This places more weight on voting when it is imminent, and less weight when it is less relevant. 
Weighting is also expected to improve the instruments performance – it produces variation across
regions and over time – although Table 4 shows the correlations to be again strong and negative, but
not stronger.
As an attempt to further measure the political bargaining process, other sources of data were 
explored.  First, data was collected on bills submitted to voting by congressmen of each sampled
region.  The more bills presented, the lower the minimum wage (the faster its inflation erosion).  Also,
a dummy was defined for whether the bill was effective (ever voted).  The more effective bills, the
higher (less inflation eroded) the minimum wage.  Two more variables were defined to measure the 
length of the passage of the bill.  The longer the passage, the more pressure (the less bargaining power),
the higher (lower) the minimum wage.
14  Also, the number of bills was weighted by the “effectiveness”
and “length” dummies.  Second, data was also collected on the number of speeches by congressmen
13 Tension can only be measured when it reaches its peak triggering an increase.  Assuming that tension grows linearly, the
voting cycle was defined as a linear time trend between each of the two increases. Other functional forms (exponential,
squared, squared root and log) were also experimented.
14 Table 4 shows that the correlation sign differ for “fraction at” and minimum wage. This is either because of no genuine
correlation (correlations are indeed low) or because of measurement error.  Regarding the latter, this data was collected
from the National Congress System Information (SICON) web page, and checked against data from the Section for
Parliamentary Information (SEDOP).  The data is assumed to be reliable and measurement error negligible (for example,
IV51 to IV53 show strong correlations).
7from each sampled region.  The more speeches needed, the lower the minimum wage.
15 Third, for 
most of the bills submitted, a commission was formed to appreciate the impact of the increase prior to 
voting.  Data on the number of congressmen from the sampled regions in each commission was
collected.  The more congressmen in favour of the increase, the lower the minimum wage, as before.
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4.2.3 Election  Data
Regional affordability is not the only criteria for political support. As a further attempt to collect 
data with independent variation, consider political propaganda:
“…around 500 mayors will meet in Brasilia to discuss a strategy to pressure the Congress against … the 
minimum wage increase... [they] changed their strategy of pressure... mainly due to the proximity of the 
election campaign for the re-election of congressmen, who dispute the support of the mayors in their 
electoral basis.” (Estadao, 11th December 2001). 
“Usually, the minimum wage increase is defined… in December, but this year the elections anticipated the
debate…  the Government strategy is to postpone the increase above inflation until after October, when the 
new president will have been elected.” (Estadao, 10th July 2002). 
Firstly, assume that incentives for more generous increases depend on the proximity of elections. 
Sobel (1999, p. 766) specified a model that “shows an incentive for Congress to time changes in the
minimum wage just before elections”.  He argues that this was the case over the entire history of the 
minimum wage, starting with the Fair Labor Standards Act going into effect just eight days before
election.  Similarly, in Brazil, the Consolidacao das Leis do Trabalho introduced the minimum wage as 
a prelude to amending the Constitution to introduce presidential elections.  In every single electoral
year in the sample period, there was a minimum wage increase – often up to two months before the 
election.  This is reassuring evidence that the minimum wage is used as political propaganda.  The 
basic assumption is that voters are myopic and opportunistic policymakers systematically manipulate
macroeconomic policy right before elections to maximize their chances of re-election (Nordhaus, 1975; 
Lindbeck, 1976).  Thus, the timing of elections was used to define an “election cycle” variable
17
Carmignani, 2003).  The closer the elections, the higher the minimum wage.  Panel III of Table 4 
confirms the expected negative correlations.  The political cycle is assumed to be exogenous, as it is 
determined by regular intervals of time.
Secondly, assume that left-wing politicians are in favour of more generous increases.  The lower
the minimum wage, the more the popular discontentment, and the more left-wing politicians are 
elected.  Data on the number of (votes on) left wing politicians was used as an instrument.
18  The
underlying assumption is that any endogeneity coming from the simultaneous determination of the
number of left wing politicians elected and employment is negligible on monthly data because 
elections happen every 4 years.  However, incentive for increases are greater not only the more popular 
15 This data was collected from the Shorthand Notes from the National Congress Sessions (and associated DCN); it is
assumed to be reliable and the measurement error negligible for IV62 to IV64, but not for IV65 and IV66.  This is because 
the last two are subject to interpretation, aggravated by the complex socio-economic-political Brazilian context.
16 A positive sign was expected for IV73, as for IV10 and IV11.  Proportions were defined, which did not change the sign of
the correlations with the minimum wage, but turned into positive the correlations with “fraction at”.  As before, this is either
because of no genuine correlation or because of measurement error. Although the data is assumed to be reliable (collected
from the SICON, and checked against the SEDOP), measurement error is not assumed to be negligible, because of the
nature of the data (there was not always a commission, not always a minimum wage one, etc.).  Even though these
instruments were thought to capture the true underlying political process, not much confidence should be placed in them.
17 Like the voting cycle, the political cycle is a linear (exponential, squared, squared root and log) time trend between two 
consecutive elections (IV80 to IV87).
18 This data is available in Nicolau (1998) and updated in his webpage.
8discontentment, but also the closer the elections.  Weighting the election data by the election cycle 
generates an additional political variable varying over time and across regions.  As before, weighting is 
also expected to improve the instruments performance, although Panel III of Table 4 shows the 
correlations to be again strong and negative, but not stronger.
Thirdly, assume that incentives for increases are greater, the lower the minimum wage.  Even if 
popular discontentment is high and the next elections are close, not much political propaganda is made
if the minimum wage is already at a relatively high level.  Weighting the election data not only by the 
election cycle, but also by the real minimum wage, generates an additional political variable varying 
over time and across regions.  Moreover, this additional political variable re-introduces the minimum
wage variation into the model (Card and Krueger, 1995; Machin and Manning, 1994).  Panel III of 
Table 4 shows that this improves the correlations.
The above instruments are in the main strongly correlated with “fraction at” (Table 4), but not
thought to be endogenously determined with employment.  Indeed, the Sargan test did not reject the 
null when instrumenting Equation (1) using such instruments (Table 3).  This is supportive of the
assumption that any correlation with past information is not as strong as to contaminate the results and 
reject the null.
Some might argue that interactions “fake” the correlation with the endogenous variable and 
“create” a weak instrument; i.e. even if the instrument is uncorrelated with the endogenous variable in 
the population, correlation might not be zero in a finite sample (Nagar, 1959; Bound et al., 1995;
Staiger and Stock, 1997).  There is nothing intrinsic about interactions that produce nonzero 
correlations.  In general, provided that there is some a priori economic reasoning in establishing the
validity of the instruments – as exhaustively discussed above – and they pass the appropriate tests (see 
Table 3), nothing particular about interactions invalidates instruments.  The issue is about weak
instruments, not interactions per se (Angrist and Krueger, 1995 and 1999).  Interactions were here
justified for a conceptual reason.  Incidentally, they produce variation in both dimensions (over time
and across regions) for instruments originally only varying in one dimension.  In general, interactions 
did not produce stronger correlations; most of the above instruments are interaction-free, and yet well 
correlated with “fraction at” (indicated in bold in Table 4).  Interactions were here motivated as further
robustness checks and were by no means crucial in defining the instruments.
4.2.4 Results 
These instruments were organized into four groups to account for potential criticisms on
interactions and on endogenous or weak instruments contaminating the results:  (1) only interaction-
free instruments; (2) a subsample from the interaction-free instruments whose correlation with
“fraction at” was higher than 0.30; (3) voting data interacted with the voting cycle; (4) election data
interacted with the election cycle and the real minimum wage.
Panels 3 to 6 of Table 2 shows that the estimates are still clustered around zero, but their
magnitude in absolute terms has changed, suggesting that some bias was corrected.  Estimates are fairly 
robust whether using the full sample or the subsample of interaction-free instruments more strongly 
correlated to “fraction at”.  The preferred specification is the one in Panel 3 of Table 2, which uses the
less debatable interaction-free set of political instruments.   A 10% increase in the nominal minimum
wage increases total employment by 0.01%, decomposed into an increase in the number of hours 
worked of 0.05% and a decrease in the number of jobs of 0.03%.  The estimates are not significant.
The estimates are marginally larger in absolute value when using voting data and larger in absolute 
value when using election data, but not significant.  The estimates are remarkably robust in the long 
run.  A 10% increase in the minimum wage decreases total employment in the long run by 0.01% at the 
9most, but does not decrease the number of jobs.  These are small employment effects when compared
to the -1% effect in the international literature.
The initial hypothesis that the uninstrumented positive short run employment effect estimates
could be upwards biased estimates of a truly negative effect encounters some support, as the 
instrumented jobs effect estimate turned into negative in all specifications using political variables as 
instruments, and there was also some evidence that the total employment effect estimates were 
negative.  However, the estimates were not precise enough for the hypothesis of biased estimates to be 
a satisfactory explanation of the non-negative employment effects found in the literature.  Nonetheless, 
the evidence here consistently suggests, across a number of instruments, that an increase in the 
minimum wage has very small adverse effects on employment.
Perhaps the explanation to such small employment effects is elsewhere.  One explanation is that
firms will not incur in employment adjustment costs if they are able to pass through to prices the higher 
costs associated to a minimum wage increase (Lemos, 2004b).  Other explanations can be offered when 
a number of specificities inherent to developing countries are considered.  For example, employment
effects would not be too adverse in an economy where: non-compliance is large and the public sector 
has an inelastic labour demand (Lemos, 2004c and 2004d); inflation is high and firms do not adjust 
employment because they perceive the minimum wage increase as temporary (Lemos, 2004e); low 
wage workers are a large proportion of the labour force (Lemos, 2004f).
5. CONCLUSION
There has been a controversial debate in the literature over the direction of the employment effect 
of the minimum wage.  Among a number of explanations, one that has not been sufficiently explored is 
that a non-negative effect might be an upward biased estimate of a truly negative effect, resulting from
the simultaneous determination of employment and the minimum wage variable. 
This hypothesis was here investigated, whereby various instrumental variables were used to ensure 
consistent estimation of the employment effect.  In presence of errors serially correlated, lagged
endogenous variable was not a valid instrument.  A number of political variables were used instead as 
exogenous excluded instruments uncorrelated with the error term and all its past history to control for 
the endogeneity of the minimum wage variable.
Using the preferred specification, a 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage was found to 
increase total employment in the short run by 0.01%, decomposed into an increase in the number of 
hours worked of 0.05% and a decrease in the number of jobs of 0.03%.  However, these estimates were 
not significant.  The estimates are remarkably robust in the long run across specifications.  A 10%
increase in the minimum wage decreases total employment in the long run by at the most 0.01%, but 
does not decrease the number of jobs.  These are small employment effects when compared to the -1% 
effect in the international literature.
The initial hypothesis that the uninstrumented positive short run employment effect estimates
could be upwards biased estimates of a truly negative effect encounters some support.  However, the 
estimates were not precise enough for this hypothesis to be a fully satisfactory explanation. 
Nonetheless, the evidence here consistently suggests that an increase in the minimum wage has very 
small adverse effects on employment in Brazil.  This is reassuring evidence that the minimum wage 
does not hurt where it hurts most: causing disemployment.
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12Table 1 - EMPLOYMENT EFFECT OF A 10% MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE - uninstrumented
short run long run
dependent coef se coef
variable (1) (2)
(1) total employment 0.13 0.03 -0.04
(2) hours worked 0.13 0.03 -0.02
(3) employment rate 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1) The minimum wage variable is "fraction at".   Toobtain the equivalent of a 10% increasein the nominal minimum wage, the
 estimates were multiplied by0.3.
(2) The dependent variable is total average hours worked, average hours worked for those working and employment rate.
(3) Rows 1 to 3 within each panel show the estimates for total, hours and job effects.
(4) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.  Controls are population
 and institutional vriables.
(5) Columns 1 and 2 showthe short and long run coefficient.
13Table 2 - EMPLOYMENT EFFECT OF A 10% MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE - instrumented
short run long run
dependent coef se coef
variable (1) (2)
1 - IV: lagged spike
(1) total employment 0.16 0.06 -0.04
(2) hours worked 0.15 0.05 -0.02
(3) employment rate 0.00 0.02 0.00
2 - IV: necessary minimum wage
(1) total employment -0.11 0.12 0.03
(2) hours worked -0.05 0.11 0.01
(3) employment rate -0.04 0.03 0.05
3 - IV: interaction-freepolitical instruments
(1) total employment 0.01 0.09 0.00
(2) hours worked 0.05 0.08 -0.01
(3) employment rate -0.03 0.03 0.04
4 - IV: interaction-free whose correlation with "fraction at"higher than 0.30
(1) total employment -0.01 0.13 0.00
(2) hours worked 0.05 0.12 -0.01
(3) employment rate -0.03 0.04 0.04
5 - IV: voting data interacted with voting dummy and voting cycle
(1) total employment 0.03 0.18 -0.01
(2) hours worked -0.02 0.17 0.00
(3) employment rate -0.06 0.06 0.04
6 - IV: election data interacted with election cycle and real minimumwage
(1) total employment -0.23 0.21 0.06
(2) hours worked -0.13 0.19 0.02
(3) employment rate -0.05 0.04 0.07
(1) The minimum wage variable is "fraction at".   To obtain the equivalent of a 10%increase in the nominal minimumwage, the
  estimates were multiplied by 0.3.
(2) Each panel shows estimates using a different set of instruments for "fraction at", as indicated.
(3) The dependent variable is total average hours worked, average hours worked for those working and employment rate.
(4) Rows 1 to 3 within each panel show the estimates for total, hours and job effects.
(5) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies. Controls are population
  and institutional vriables.
(6) Columns 1 and 2 show the short and long run coefficient.
14Table 3 - SPECIFICATION TESTS - for models in Table 2
dependent Sargan test df Hausman test se F test df
variable (1) (2) (3)
1-  I V : la g g e d  s p ik e
(1) hours worked 24.99 11 -0.13 0.20 6.35 88/895
(2) employment rate 16.86 11 0.03 0.03 33.21 88/895
2 - IV: subsistence minimum wage
(1) hours worked 24.69 12 0.65 0.39 3.15 89/894
(2) employment rate 58.28 12 0.03 0.02 31.35 89/894
3 - IV: interaction-free political instruments
(1) hours worked 116.11 74 0.28 0.29 2.78 147/826
(2) employment rate 110.54 74 -0.01 0.03 44.39 148/826
4 - IV: interaction-free whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.30
(1) hours worked 40.21 25 0.27 0.43 2.68 102/881
(2) employment rate 37.78 25 0.00 0.03 54.52 102/881
5 - IV: voting data interacted with voting dummy and voting cycle
(1) hours worked 9.59 11 0.52 0.55 2.61 92/891
(2) employment rate 5.44 11 0.02 0.03 35.40 92/891
6 - IV: election data interacted with election cycle and real minimum wage
(1) hours worked 21.05 17 0.89 0.58 2.61 90/889
(2) employment rate 26.67 17 0.03 0.03 34.11 90/889
(1) The minimum wage variable is "fraction at".   To obtain the equivalent of a 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage, the
   estimates were multiplied by 0.3.
(2) Eachpanel shows specification tests for the associated models inTable2 using a different set of instruments for "fraction at",a si n d i c a t e d .
(3) The dependent variable is total average hours worked, average hours worked for those working and employment rate.
(4) Rows 1 to 2 within each panel show the estimates for hours and job effects. The results for total hours are qualitativelythe same as
   the results for hours worked and were here omitted.
(5) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies. Controls are population
   and institutional vriables.
(6) Columns 1 to 3 show respectively Sargan, Hausman and F test (in the first step of the 2SLS).  Degree of freedom for Sargan and
   F tests are indicated.  Standard errors for Hausman test are indicated.
15Table 4 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS AND BOTH "FRACTION AT" AND MINIMUM WAGE - continues
IV fraction MW instrument intuition
I - POLITICIANS DATA
IV1 0.21 0.62 no. of politicians from each sampled region out of the 100 most influential politicians in the country the more influential the congressmen and the more pro-increase, the higher the minimum wage
IV2 0.28 0.16 IV1 as a proportion of total influential politicians from sampled regions as above
IV3 0.01 0.38 measure of how worker-sympathetic congressmen from each sampled region are the higher the mark, the more pro-increase the congressmen, the higher the minimum wage
IV4 -0.56 -0.51 dummy: 1 if left wing, 0 otherwise for congressmen in IV3 (average) the more left wing congressmen, the higher the minimum wage
IV5 0.16 0.04 dummy: 1 if university graduated, 0 otherwise for congressmen in IV3 (average) the more educated the congressmen, the greater the support for a higher minimum wage
IV6 -0.25 -0.54 no. of mandates for congressmen in IV3 (average) the longer the congressmen are in power, the less favourable they are of a higher minimum wage
IV7 -0.42 -0.35 interaction of IV3*IV4*IV5*IV6
II - VOTING DATA
IV8 -0.44 -0.59 no. of senator votes from each sampled region in favour of the minimum wage increase the more congressmen in favour of the increase (against a larger increase), the lower the minimum wage
IV9 -0.56 -0.48 no. of deputy votes from each sampled region in favour of the minimum wage increase as above
IV10 -0.20 -0.17 no. of senator votes from each sampled region against the minimum wage increase the more congressmen against the increase (in favour of a lower increase), the lower the minimum wage
IV11 -0.50 -0.49 no. of deputy votes from each sampled region against the minimum wage increase as above
IV12 -0.07 -0.05 no. of senators from each sampled region absent when the minimum wage increase was voted for the more congressmen absent (the less pressure for a larger increase), the lower the minimum wage
IV13 -0.13 -0.35 no. of deputies from each sampled region absent when the minimum wage increase was voted for as above
IV14 -0.51 -0.60 IV8 as a proportion of total senator votes as above
IV15 -0.42 -0.36 IV9 as a proportion of total deputy votes as above
IV16 -0.20 -0.20 IV10 as a proportion of total senator votes as above
IV17 -0.47 -0.60 IV11 as a proportion of total deputy votes as above
IV18 -0.47 -0.49 dummy for senator's votes in IV8 to IV13: 3 non-secret, 1 secret, and 2 partyoriented vote the lower the minimum wage, the more often non-secret votes are demanded (to expose those against it)
IV19 -0.59 -0.60 dummy for deputy's votes in IV8 to IV13: 3 non-secret, 1 secret, and 2 party oriented vote as above
IV20 -0.38 -0.49 interaction of IV8*IV18
IV21 -0.54 -0.47 interaction of IV9*IV19
IV22 -0.19 -0.15 interaction of IV10*IV18
IV23 -0.49 -0.49 interaction of IV11*IV19
IV24 -0.07 -0.05 interaction of IV12*IV18
IV25 -0.12 -0.34 interaction of IV13*IV19
IV26 -0.44 -0.49 interaction of IV14*IV18
IV27 -0.20 -0.17 interaction of IV15*IV19
IV28 -0.44 -0.34 interaction of IV16*IV18
IV29 -0.46 -0.57 interaction of IV17*IV19
IV30 0.36 0.29 voting cycle (linear) the more often minimum wage bills are voted, the higher the minimum wage (the less inflation erosion)
IV31 0.37 0.27 voting cycle (squared root) as above
IV32 0.08 0.02 voting cycle (squared) as above
IV33 0.34 0.22 voting cycle (log) as above
IV34 0.08 0.02 voting cycle (exponential) as above
IV35 -0.25 -0.42 interaction of IV8*IV30
IV36 -0.40 -0.43 interaction of IV9*IV30
IV37 -0.17 -0.14 interaction of IV10*IV30
IV38 -0.31 -0.36 interaction of IV11*IV30
IV39 -0.30 -0.44 interaction of IV14*IV30
IV40 -0.34 -0.42 interaction of IV15*IV30
IV41 -0.18 -0.17 interaction of IV16*IV30
IV42 -0.28 -0.42 interaction of IV17*IV30
IV43 -0.29 -0.45 interaction of IV20*IV30
IV44 -0.40 -0.43 interaction of IV21*IV30
IV45 -0.15 -0.11 interaction of IV22*IV30
IV46 -0.31 -0.36 interaction of IV23*IV30
IV47 -0.34 -0.47 interaction of IV26*IV30
IV48 -0.33 -0.40 interaction of IV27*IV30
IV49 -0.16 -0.15 interaction of IV28*IV30
IV50 -0.28 -0.41 interaction ofI V 2 9 * I V 3 0
1Table 4 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS AND BOTH "FRACTION AT" AND MINIMUM WAGE - continues
IV fractionMW instrument intuition
IV51 -0.30 -0.34 no. of minimumwage bills submitted by congressmen fromeach sampled region the more (need for) minimumwage bills, the lower the minimum wage (the faster inflation erosion)
IV52 -0.11 -0.05 no. of minimumwage bills submitted by left wing congressmen fromeach sampled region as above
IV53 -0.31 -0.38 no. of minimumwage increase bills submitted by congressmen from each sampled region as above
IV54 -0.07 -0.02 IV52 as a proportion of IV51 as above
IV55 -0.29 -0.44 IV53 as a proportion of IV51 as above
IV56 0.06 0.14 dummy for bills in IV51: 0 if bill not effective and 1 if effective (average) the more effective the bills (the less inflation erosion), the higher the minimumwage
IV57 -0.06 0.04 no. days minimum wage bills in IV51 took to be appreciated (sum, if more than 1 bill per month) the longer the bills take to be appreciated (the less bargaining power), the lower the minimumwage
IV58 0.00 0.11 no. days minimum wage bills in IV51 took to be appreciated (average per month) as above
IV59 -0.32 -0.39 interaction of IV51*IV56
IV60 -0.11 -0.08 interaction of IV51*IV57
IV61 -0.08 0.00 interaction of IV51*IV58
IV62 -0.15 -0.14 no. of speeches fromcongressmen from each sampled region regarding the minimum wage the more (need) for speeches, the lower the minimum wage
IV63 -0.14 -0.14 no. of speeches from left wing congressmen fromeach sampled region regarding the minimumwage as above
IV64 -0.14 -0.15 no. of speeches fromcongressmen from each sampled region regarding a minimum wage increase as above
IV65 -0.14 -0.12 no. of speeches fromcongressmen from each sampled region favourable to a minimumwage increase as above
IV66 -0.10 -0.09 no. of speeches fromcongressmen from each sampled region against a minimum wage increase as above
IV67 -0.16 -0.16 IV62 as a proportion of speeches as above
IV68 -0.17 -0.18 IV63 as a proportion of speeches as above
IV69 -0.13 -0.13 IV64 as a proportion of speeches as above
IV70 -0.08 -0.06 IV65 as a proportion of speeches as above
IV71 -0.19 -0.23 no. of congressmen fromeach sampled region in minimum wage commissions the more congressmen in the commission in favour of the increase, the lower the minimumwage, as for IV8
IV72 -0.25 -0.19 no. of left wing congressmen fromeach sampled region in minimum wage commissions as above
IV73 -0.12 -0.22 no. of right wing congressmen from each sampled region in minimum wage commissions as above
IV74 -0.20 -0.30 IV71 as a proportion of commission congressmen as above
IV75 0.10 -0.16 IV71 as a proportion of commission congressmen fromthe sampled regions as above
IV76 0.04 -0.08 IV72 as a proportion of commission congressmen fromthe sampled regions as above
IV77 0.10 -0.16 IV73 as a proportion of commission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
III - ELECTIONS DATA
IV78 -0.27 -0.35 national election cycle (linear) the closer the elections, the more generous the minimum wage increase
IV79 -0.03 -0.05 municipal election cycle (linear) as above
IV80 -0.22 -0.30 national election cycle (square root) as above
IV81 -0.04 -0.02 municipal election cycle (square root) as above
IV82 -0.31 -0.39 national election cycle (squared) as above
IV83 -0.20 -0.22 municipal election cycle (squared) as above
IV84 -0.15 -0.22 national election cycle (log) as above
IV85 -0.05 -0.01 municipal election cycle (log) as above
IV86 -0.03 -0.03 national election cycle (exponential) as above
IV87 -0.05 -0.08 municipal election cycle (exponential) as above
IV88 -0.38 -0.54 no. of left wing candidates to president electedfrom eachsampled region the lower the minimum wage, the more left wing congressmen elected
IV89 -0.64 -0.34 no. of left wing candidates to federal deputy elected from each sampled region as above
IV90 -0.34 -0.19 no. of left wing candidates to senator elected from each sampled region as above
IV91 -0.23 -0.25 no. of left wing candidates to governor elected from each sampled region as above
IV92 -0.49 -0.28 no. of left wing candidates to state deputy elected from each sampled region as above
IV93 -0.02 -0.07 no. of left wing candidates to capital mayor elected fromeach sampled region as above
IV94 -0.38 -0.54 IV88 as a proportion of total number of candidates to president thelower the minimum wage, the more left wingcongressmen elected
IV95 -0.60 -0.48 IV89 as a proportion of total number of candidates to federal deputy as above
IV96 -0.45 -0.46 IV90 as a proportion of total number of candidates to senator as above
IV97 -0.28 -0.28 IV91 as a proportion of total number of candidates to governor as above
IV98 -0.60 -0.48 IV92 as a proportion of total number of candidates to state deputy as above
IV99 -0.02 -0.07 IV93 as a proportion of total number of candidates to capital mayor as above
2Table 4 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS AND BOTH "FRACTION AT" AND MINIMUM WAGE - continued
IV fraction MW instrument intuition
IV100 -0.26 -0.25 no. of votes in left wing president candidates in each sampled region as above
IV101 -0.16 -0.11 no. of votes in left wing federal deputy candidates in each sampled region as above
IV102 -0.30 -0.12 no. of votes in left wing governor candidates in each sampled region as above
IV103 -0.15 -0.06 no. of votes in left wing state deputy candidates in each sampled region as above
IV104 -0.54 -0.69 IV100 as a proportion of total votes in president candidates as above
IV105 -0.63 -0.49 IV101 as a proportion of total votes in federal deputy candidates as above
IV106 -0.39 -0.30 IV102 as a proportion of votes in governor candidates as above
IV107 -0.61 -0.49 IV 103 as a proportion of votes in state deputy candidates as above
IV108 -0.33 -0.46 interaction of IV78*IV98
IV109 -0.49 -0.37 interaction of IV79*IV98
IV110 -0.35 -0.23 interaction of IV80*IV98
IV111 -0.25 -0.29 interaction of IV81*IV98
IV112 -0.39 -0.34 interaction of IV82*IV94
IV113 -0.03 -0.11 interaction of IV83*IV99
IV114 -0.33 -0.46 interaction of IV84*IV98
IV115 -0.46 -0.45 interaction of IV85*IV98
IV116 -0.39 -0.48 interaction of IV86*IV98
IV117 -0.31 -0.31 interaction of IV87*IV98
IV118 -0.45 -0.46 interaction of IV88*IV98
IV119 -0.03 -0.11 interaction of IV89*IV99
IV120 -0.23 -0.26 interaction of IV90*IV98
IV121 -0.20 -0.08 interaction of IV91*IV98
IV122 -0.30 -0.19 interaction of IV92*IV98
IV123 -0.20 -0.09 interaction of IV93*IV98
IV124 -0.43 -0.55 interaction of IV94*IV98
IV125 -0.45 -0.46 interaction of IV95*IV98
IV126 -0.35 -0.34 interaction of IV96*IV98
IV127 -0.44 -0.46 interaction of IV97*IV98
IV128 -0.33 -0.45 interaction of IV108*minimum wage
IV129 -0.46 -0.22 interaction of IV109*minimum wage
IV130 -0.32 -0.16 interaction of IV110*minimum wage
IV131 -0.21 -0.22 interaction of IV111*minimum wage
IV132 -0.33 -0.16 interaction of IV112*minimum wage
IV133 -0.03 -0.24 interaction of IV113*minimum wage
IV134 -0.33 -0.45 interaction of IV114*minimum wage
IV135 -0.42 -0.30 interaction of IV115*minimum wage
IV136 -0.38 -0.39 interaction of IV116*minimum wage
IV137 -0.27 -0.24 interaction of IV117*minimum wage
IV138 -0.41 -0.30 interaction of IV118*minimum wage
IV139 -0.03 -0.24 interaction of IV119*minimum wage
IV140 -0.23 -0.24 interaction of IV120*minimum wage
IV141 -0.17 -0.06 interaction of IV121*minimum wage
IV142 -0.29 -0.13 interaction of IV122*minimum wage
IV143 -0.16 -0.05 interaction of IV123*minimum wage
IV144 -0.42 -0.50 interaction of IV124*minimum wage
IV145 -0.41 -0.29 interaction of IV125*minimum wage
IV146 -0.32 -0.24 interaction of IV126*minimum wage
IV147 -0.40 -0.29 interaction of IV127*minimum wage
source:  IV1-IV44 National Congress; IV45-IV49 DIAP
(1) instruments in bold are prior to interaction
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